INNOVATION AND REGULATION IN THE PESTICIDE INDUSTRY by Ollinger, Michael & Fernandez-Cornejo, Jorge
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This paper examines the impact of pesticide regulation on the number of new pesticide
registrations and pesticide toxicity. Results suggest that regulation adversely affects new
pesticide introductions but encourages the development of pesticides with fewer toxic side
effects. The estimated regression model implies that a 10% increase in regulatory costs (about
$1.5 million per pesticide) causes a 5% reduction in the number of pesticides with higher
toxicity
Researchers, such as Headley (1968) and Campbell
(1976) have shown empirically that chemical pes-
ticides have played a major role in increasing ag-
ricultural productivity. However, there is concern
that chemical pesticides may contaminate ground
and surface water, have harmful effects on wild-
life, leave residues on agricultural products, and
cause health risks to farm workers (Harper and
Zilberman 1989). These potential side effects have
prompted strict regulation,
Critics of chemical pesticide regulation, such as
Green, Hartley, and West (1977), assert that the
cost of complying with regulations reduces the in-
centive to develop the new active ingredients
needed for use in herbicides, insecticides, fungi-
cides, and other chemical pesticides. Consistent
with this view, Gianessi and Puffer (1992) argue
that regulatory costs have encouraged firms to reg-
ister chemical pesticides only for major crop uses,
such as corn, and have deterred firms from regis-
tering chemical pesticides for minor crop uses,
such as fruits and vegetables. Others (Lichtenberg,
Spear, and Zilberman 1993) claim that more strin-
gent regulations may result in chemical pesticides
with higher toxicity.
Questions of the impact of regulation on regis-
trations, chemical pesticide crop uses, and pesti-
cide toxicity may be closely linked. Greene, Hart-
ley, and West (1977) believe that high regulatory
costs reduce the incentive to develop chemical pes-
ticides for minor crop uses and encourage firms to
develop chemical pesticides that are effective in
controlling many types of pests and in diverse
weather conditions. However, these wide-spectrum
chemical pesticides are the ones most likely to
have more undesirable environmental side effects.
Historical evidence suggests a link between
health and environmental testing costs and pesti-
cide development time and the number, type, and
toxicity of new pesticide introductions. Between
1970 and 1989, as pesticide research expenditures
used for health and environmental testing rose
from 14% to 47% of total pesticide research spend-
ing and chemical pesticide product development
time rose from seven to eleven years, the number
of chemical pesticides dropped from 46 over the
1972-76 period to 30 over the 1985-89 period.
The number of new chemical pesticide registra-
tions for vegetables and other minor crops declined
from 62 over the 1972-76 period to 15 for 1985-
89, even though registrations for corn and other
major crops remained almost unchanged, and the
number of pesticides with chronic toxicity effects
declined from 22% of new pesticides over the
1972–76 period to 6% of new pesticides for 1985-
89 (table 1).
This paper has two purposes: (1) to examine the
impact of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
regulation on chemical pesticide innovation and
(2) to investigate the relationship between regula-
tion and the toxicity of new pesticides.’ The paper
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LBy innovation, we mean the first-time registration of a new chemical
active ingredient for use as a pesticide, We use first-time registrations
rather than patents as a measure of innovation because many patents are
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Table 1. Number of New Chemical Pesticides and Toxicity Effects
Toxicity Effects
Fkh and Total
Year Acute Chronic Wildlife Other Totala Registrations
1972 3 1 3 4 5 12
1973 1 2 5 2 7 4
1974 2 2 4 2 6 11
1975 1 1 3 1 6 12
1976 0 1 3 1 3 7
1977 1 1 1 0 1 1
1978 0 0 0 0 0 0
1979 2 1 5 2 7 9
1980 2 2 2 1 5 9
1981 1 0 2 1 3 5
1982 1 1 3 3 5 7
1983 1 2 4 0 6 8
1984 0 2 3 0 4 7
1985 1 1 3 2 4 4
1986 1 0 2 0 2 8
1987 3 0 3 3 6 4
1988 2 0 2 2 3 4
1989 1 0 2 1 3 10
1972–76 7 6 18 8 27 46
1977–81 6 4 10 4 16 24
1980-84 5 7 13 5 23 36
1985-89 7 1 12 8 18 30
‘Since one chemical uesticide may have multiple health and environmental effects, this number is less than the sum of all pesticide
registrations with at least one health or environmental effect.
differs from previous studies in that it uses firm-
level rather than industry-level data to examine the
impact of regulation on innovation (new chemical
pesticide introductions), and it empirically exam-
ines the impact of pesticide regulation on pesticide
toxicity.
Pesticide Regulation
Concern over the health consequences of agricul-
tural chemicals led Congress to enact the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) in 1948. This legislation and several sub-
sequent amendments required that pesticide pro-
ducers develop data showing the health effects of
pesticides, register pesticides against the claim of
effectiveness by the manufacturer, and state pesti-
cide toxicity on the label, Pesticides are also regu-
lated by various provisions of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FFDCA), which
requires pesticides to meet tolerances to gain reg-
istration and establishes that enforcement is to be
ciplines, including chemistry and botany, and requiring extensive field
testing.
carried out by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and the USDA (Hatch 1982).2
After transferring FIFRA enforcement to the
EPA in 1970, Congress greatly strengthened pes-
ticide regulation with a 1972 FIFRA amendment.
Under this legislation, Congress gave the EPA re-
sponsibility for reregistering existing chemical
pesticides, examining the effects of pesticides on
fish and wildlife, and evaluating chronic and acute
toxicity effects. Overall, the amendment greatly in-
creased the health and safety data needed to sup-
port pesticide registrations, required existing pes-
ticides to be brought up to current standards, and
gave the EPA authority to cancel or suspend pes-
ticides that may pose unreasonable health or envi-
ronmental risks (Hatch 1982).
A 1978 FIFRA amendment clarified several as-
pects of the 1972 legislation. These included the
2 Botfr statutes (FIFRA and the FFDCA) were amended by the Food
Quality Protection Act (FQPA) of 1996. Under FIFRA, EPA regulates
pesticide use through registration and labeling requirements. Under
FFDCA, EPA establishes maximum allowable levels (tolerances) for
pesticide residues in foods sold in interstate commerce. FQPA eliminated
the dktirrction between raw and processed food tolerances, as stipulated
in the Delaney clause, and required that pesticide tolerances be set such
that they would ensure a reasonable certainty that no harm would result
frum aggregate exposure to the chemical pesticide residues (Schierow
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registration of pesticides with low measurable en-
vironmental risks, the regulatory costs of minor use
pesticides, the reregistration of existing pesticides,
and the use of existing field data by a second pes-
ticide developer.
Regulatory stringency usually increases gradu-
ally. Any regulatory body requires time to write
formal regulatory rules to implement legislation.
Prior to these new rules, status quo rules are used.
EPA rule-making practices for the 1972 FIFRA
amendment were no exception, The EPA published
formal rules in 1978, 1982, and 1994. Each set of
rules was in addition to those in existence in 1972
and increased regulatory stringency beyond that
which existed previously.
Testing requirements for chemical pesticides
now include up to seventy different types of tests.
They consist of a two-generation reproduction and
teratogenicity study, a mutagenicity study, and
toxicology studies, i.e., acute, subchronic, chronic
oncogenicity, and chronic feeding effects. These
tests cost millions of dollars and can take several
years to complete. Additional tests are used to
evaluate the effects of pesticides on aquatic sys-
tems, wildlife, and other environmental areas, and
farm worker health.
Firm and Industry Attributes Associated
with Innovation
A large body of economic research exists on the
impact of regulation on pharmaceutical innova-
tions. Pharmaceutical industry research is particu-
larly useful for analyses of the pesticide industry
because of the many similarities between the two
industries. Both industries are dominated by large
multiproduct firms that rely on internal research to
develop new products that have long development
cycles. Both industries also face stringent govern-
ment product regulation. For example, pesticide
firms in 1992 had a research-to-sales ratio of 23%
and environmental and toxicity testing costs that
consumed about 5090 of research expenditures
(National Agricultural Chemical Association
[NACA] 1992). Pharmaceutical firms had a similar
research-to-sales ratio and also had high regula-
tion-related costs.
Previous economic research has characterized
technological innovation as a function of research
and development spending, past success in devel-
oping innovative products, regulatory costs, firm
size, market structure, and demand conditions.
Economists studying new pharmaceutical product
innovation assert that firms increase profits by gen-
erating economically useful knowledge from re-
search effort. Empirically, researchers have found
a strong positive impact of research expenditures
on new pharmaceutical introductions (Grabowski,
Vernon, and Thomas 1978; Thomas 1990) and
sales per new pharmaceutical (Thomas 1990).
Research productivity may vary across firms:
Demsetz (1973) argues that superior firms grow at
the expense of less efficient firms, and Klepper and
Graddy (1990) assert that firms with higher prod-
uct quality and higher productivity prosper at the
expense of rivals with lower product quality and
productivity. In a research-intensive industry, this
research suggests that recent success encourages
future success through new product development.
For example, Thomas (1990) attributes the inabil-
ity of small firms to grow in the pharmaceutical
industry to a decline in their research productivity.
A central theme of innovation studies is the im-
pact of regulation on research productivity. Econo-
mists have shown that regulation adversely affects
new pharmaceutical introductions (Peltzman 1973;
Grabowski, Vernon, and Thomas 1978; Thomas
1990), and, by discouraging the development of
drugs that serve small markets, increases sales per
new pharmaceutical (Thomas 1990).
In the pesticide industry, the Council for Agri-
cultural Science and Technology (CAST 1981)
found that EPA regulation encouraged an increase
in research expenditures, a delay in the time re-
quired to register and reregister pesticides, a de-
cline in the number of new pesticides registered
per year, and a shift in the allocation of research
expenditure from synthesis, screening, and field
testing to administration, environmental testing,
and residue analysis. Additionally, using annual
data, Hatch (1982) found that increased regulatory
stringency led to a 7910-9’%0 decline in pesticide
registrations,
Greene, Hartley, and West (1977) and Teece
(1982) assert that multinational firms enhance re-
search efficiency by centralizing research in one
country and marketing products on a worldwide
basis, They also argue that multinational firms are
better able to take advantage of product research
than are single-market firms because multinational
firms have more market outlets. These claims sug-
gest that multinational firms with low U.S. re-
search expenditures may have a large portfolio of
chemical pesticides that could be sold in the United
States, giving them higher “apparent” U.S. re-
search productivity than competitors with well-
established U.S. research operations.
Galbraith (1952) suggests that large firms have
greater financial capacity and thus can better bear
research risks than can smaller rivals. Acs and Au-
dretsch (1987) empirically show that large firms18 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
have higher research productivity than do small
firms in capital-intensive, differentiated-goods, oli-
gopolistic industries. Hence, firm size may en-
hance research productivity.
Kamien and Schwartz (1982) remind us that in-
novations are a response to profit opportunities.
The robustness of demand influences the number
of products a market can absorb and thus may af-
fect innovation. In addition, Kaplinsky (1983) sug-
gests that the relationship between firm size and
innovation varies for different phases of the indus-
try growth cycle. Kamien and Schwartz (1982)
agree, suggesting that growing industries generate
more inventive activity than stagnating or declin-
ing industries.
The Innovation Process in the Chemical
Pesticide Industry
The cost of pesticide development includes re-
search and regulatory costs. Increases in either re-
search or regulatory costs cause the gap between
potential revenues and costs to narrow and result in
some pesticides becoming unprofitable.
The objective of research and development is to
develop new chemical pesticides with high effi-
cacy that can generate substantial revenues and,
hence, profits. Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo
(1995) found that research expenditures positively
affect new chemical pesticide product sales, Beach
and Carlson (1993) determined that a tradeoff ex-
ists between pesticide efficacy and user safety and
environmental qualities. However, with an efficacy
elasticity exceeding 2.4 and user safety and water
quality elasticities ranging from –O.10 to -0.14,
farmers appear to value efficacy much more than
safety and environmental qualities. Accordingly, a
pesticide firm must first and foremost develop a
chemical pesticide with high efficacy. However,
insecticides (Plapp 1993) and other pesticides
(Lichtenberg, Spear, and Zilberman 1993) with
high efficacy are also very toxic. Hence, in order to
develop a pesticide that can generate high rev-
enues, a firm must select a chemical pesticide can-
didate from a group of very toxic compounds.
To obtain registration, a chemical pesticide can-
didate must pass EPA standards, If a firm selects
only chemical compounds with high efficacy and
these compounds are very toxic, then many chemi-
cal compounds will not meet EPA standards and
would have to be dropped. Moreover, as efficacy
rises, more chemical pesticide candidates are likely
to be discarded, but the remaining successful
chemical pesticides are likely to generate more
sales and be more toxic than chemical pesticides
with lower efficacy. Hence, higher search costs
(research expenditures) are expected to lead to the
development of chemical pesticides with greater
efficacy and higher toxicity relative to all chemical
pesticides.3
A rise in regulatory stringency suggests either a
reduction in existing tolerances or stricter enforce-
ment of current standards. In either case, an in-
crease in stringency reduces the number of chemi-
cal pesticide-candidates that can pass regulatory
tests because chemical pesticides that formerly
complied with regulatory standards may no longer
meet new guidelines. Hence, an increase in regu-
latory stringency should reduce chemical pesticide
toxicity.
Pesticide Innovation Model
Equation (1) is an empirical model of the relation-
ship between economically useful innovations—
new chemical pesticide registrations (NiJ-and
several factors believed to affect innovation.
(1) ln(Ni,) = PO+ ~lln(RESEARCFIiJ
+ ~21n(LG3SHRit)+(331N7’i,
+ (34RDINTit + ~Jn(LSHAREil)
+ (361n(ARUL72t)
+ ~71n(GROW5t)+ l it,
where Researchist is firm pesticide research ex-
penditures; LG3SHRit is firm market share growth;
INTit is a dummy variable for firms with large
overseas sales but no U.S. research and develop-
ment and low or no U.S. sales in 1972; RDINTit
is an interaction term between ZNTit and
Research,; LSHAREit is firm market share;
ARUL72, is pesticide regulation; and GROW5, is
industry growth. All variables except the dummy
3This positive relationship between research expenditures and pesti-
cide toxicity (and pesticide efficacy) does not imply that pesticide tox-
icity is greater than that which would be acceptable to farmers. Cropper,
et al. (1992) found that EPA regulators respond tn diverse interest
groups, snch as consumers, environmentalists, and farmers, when they
decide to cancel m continue tbe registrations of carcinogenic pesticides.
They also estimated that the implicit value EPA regulators place on
human safety risks is $35 million per applicator cancer case avoided.
Since this implicit $35 millinn value of a human life exceeds the more
common $3 million to $7 million statistical value (1990 dollars) used by
Viscusi (1993) for a life and the $5 million used by Food and Drag
Administration regulators, EPA regulators appear to establish toxicity
standards that are far more stringent than those standards farmers de-
mand. As a consequence, when pesticide firms cumply with EPA regu-
lations, they also satisfy farmer demand for user safety and environmen-
tal qualities. This does not imply that all pesticides apprnved by the EPA
barely meet regulatory standards. Pesticides do vary in user safety and
environmental qualities. Farmers recognize this variation aad, for pesti-
cides with equal efficacy, wmdd likely chonse the pesticide with superior
user safety arrd environmental qualities.Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo
variable are in log form. Precise variable defini-
tions are given in Appendix A.
Lagged market share growth is used as a mea-
sure of firm success. Firms can increase market
share by developing new and better products or
buying another firm. In either case, an increase in
market share reflects superior ability (Demsetz
1973).
The dummy variable lNTi, is used to control for
potentially higher international entrant research
productivity. Historical data indicates that over the
1972–89 period, the number of research-intensive
pesticide companies dropped from 33 to 19,but the
number of foreign-based companies rose by three
and the market share held by foreign-based com-
panies rose from 18% to 439’o (Ollinger and
Fernandez-Comejo 1995). All of the foreign-based
entrant firms were major international chemical
pesticide producers with large portfolios of chemi-
cal pesticides but no U.S. research expenditures in
1972.
As international entrants begin research in the
United States, their apparently high research pro-
ductivity should diminish. International entrants
used pesticides developed in overseas laboratories
for overseas markets as vehicles for entry into the
U.S. market. Since most pesticide development
was completed prior to U.S. introduction, intern-
ationalentrant U.S. pesticide research costs were
low and their apparent research productivity
should have been high. However, as the intern-
ationalentrants established pesticide laboratories in
the United States in order to develop pesticides for
the U.S, market, their research costs per new pes-
ticide innovation rose and their apparent high
research productivity should have diminished.
Accordingly, we interact the international en-
trant dummy variable and research expenditures
(RDINTit). This variable should negatively affect
innovation.
Market share is a proxy for firm size. Pesticide
firms included in the study sample are part of
larger chemical companies, and each has signifi-
cant resources for research on chemical pesticides,
Yet reputation effects (Nelson 1959) and the abil-
ity to distribute and market products (Kamien and
Schwartz 1982) encourage innovation. Since firms
with high market share are likely to be larger and
better known and to have more products than firms
with low market shares, market share should en-
courage innovation.
ARUL72, is a proxy for regulation. Economists
examining pharmaceutical innovation (Peltzman
1973; Grabowski, Vernon, and Thomas 1978; and
Thomas 1990) and pesticide innovation (Hatch
1982; CAST 1981) have suggested that regulation
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adversely affects innovation, Thus, regulation
should discourage innovation. Empirically, since
firms must use research expenditures to conduct
various toxicity and environmental tests in order to
comply with EPA regulations, results showing that
EPA regulation adversely affects innovation ac-
counts for the share of firm research devoted to
human safety and environmental purposes.
GROW5, serves as a measure of industry
growth. Klepper and Graddy (1990) assert that
high sales growth exists in the early stages of in-
dustry evolution and low or negative growth oc-
curs in the later stages. Some evidence suggests
that the pesticide industry made a transition from
growth to maturity over the 1966–92 period. Be-
tween 1966 and 1976, the sales of herbicides, the
most commonly used type of pesticide, rose from
101 million pounds to 373,9 million pounds of
active ingredients (a.i,). By 1982, herbicide sales
increased to 455,6 million pounds of a,i, and then
stabilized, reaching 478,1 million pounds of a.i. in
1992 (Osteen and Szmedra 1989; Delvo 1993),
This transition from growth to maturity suggests
that industry growth may or may not affect pesti-
cide innovation.4
Regulatory Variables
In previous studies of EPA regulation, Hatch
(1982) used the time required from pesticide dis-
covery to EPA registration (development time) as a
measure of regulatory stringency. The CAST study
(198 1) used three measures of stringency: time
required to register a pesticide with the EPA,
the coincidence of legislation and productivity
changes, and the change in the uses of research and
development expenditures, i.e., pesticide develop-
ment for pesticide-testing.
Severe measurement problems exist for use of
the change in the development time and change in
the time required to register a pesticide with EPA
as proxies for regulation. Baily (1972) argues that
the least costly and most easily developed innova-
tions are discovered and developed at the begin-
ning of an industry life cycle and that future inno-
vations require greater research expenditures and
longer development time, suggesting that a change
in development time can be attributed to either
4 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the Osteen and Szmedra
(1989) and Delvo (1993) and Delvo (1993) data may not be precise
because budget priorities prior to 1987 prevented the collection of high-
quality pesticide usage information, However, these data do capture the
overall pesticide usage trends, are consistent with pesticide producer data
collected by the EPA, and thus dn reflect the major changes in the growth
of pesticide use over tbe 1972–91 period.20 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
innovation depletion or regulatory intensity. Simi-
larly, since EPA registration time depends on the
number of tests that regulators must examine and
not necessarily on the rigor of those tests, the time
required to register a pesticide with the EPA may
change even though stringency does not. Thomas
(1990) make a similar point for pharmaceuticals.
We consider three definitions of the regulatory
variable-AR UL72,A VREG, and PESLAB-in or-
der to show that results do not depend on a par-
ticular definition of regulation. Each regulatory
proxy also relates strongly to the other proxies and
corresponds directly to the regulation of chemical
pesticides.
ARUL72, is based on the EPA cost estimates of
mandated testing requirements for registering
chemical pesticides under FIFRA, and is similar to
the legislation changes measure of stringency used
by CAST (1981). We use mandated testing re-
quirements rather than legislation because firms
must be in compliance with testing requirements in
order to register a pesticide.
The EPA formally issued rules in 1978 and
1982. The EPA also wrote, but did not formally
adopt, another set of rules in 1994. These rules
included requirements that were in addition to
those in existence in 1972. Each set of rules re-
quired an economic impact assessment, which
gives cost estimates and can be used to calculate an
index of estimated costs (EPA-estimated costs).
Using 1972 as a base year, this index suggests that
the 1978 regulations increased environmental and
toxicity testing costs by 30% over those in 1972;
the 1982 rules raised environmental and toxicity
testing costs by 95% over those in 1972; and the
1994 rules increased environmental and toxicity
testing costs by about 100% over those in 1972.
According to Arnold Aspelin (interview with
author, January 1995) and Gary Ballard (interview
with author, January 1995) of the EPA, who wrote
the economic impact analysis for the rule changes,
new chemical pesticide registrants complied with
new rules prior to their formal publication. For
example, chemical pesticide registrants currently
adhere to all testing requirements proposed in 1994
and followed all of the 1978 rules in 1977 and
some of the 1978 rules in 1972. Hence, 1978 rules
formalized the new procedures established by the
EPA over the 1972–77 period, 1982 rules reflect
revised testing procedures introduced during the
1978–81 period, and 1994 rules reflect changes
introduced after 1982.
Since pesticide development is a lengthy pro-
cess, which increased from seven to eleven years
over the 1972–89 period, firms must anticipate fu-
ture regulatory requirements in order to avoid a
future rejection by the EPA. As a result, for
ARUL72,, we assume that actual compliance oc-
curred in 1972 for the 1978 rules, in 1979 for the
1982 rules, and in 1983 for the 1994 rules.
To verify the robustness of our results, we also
use two other measures of regulation, As one proxy
we employ industry pesticide research expendi-
tures used for toxicological and environmental
testing as a fraction of all pesticide research and
development expenditures (AVREGt). This mea-
sure is similar to the research and development
expenditures variable used by CAST (1981).
The pesticide approval period at the EPA be-
comes longer when regulation becomes more strin-
gent and drops when the number of personnel
evaluating new pesticide candidates increases.
Since approval times at the EPA have been rela-
tively constant over the past twenty years, a change
in employment should provide a measure of the
change in regulatory stringency. Hence, employ-
ment at the Office of Pesticide Programs
(PESLAB,) acts as the third proxy of regulation.
We define each regulatory term as a lag struc-
ture over the industry average chemical pesticide
development cycle because firms exclude sunk
costs when making development plans. For ex-
ample, if a firm were at the beginning of the chemi-
cal pesticide development process, it would bal-
ance development and testing costs (DT) against
potential revenues. If regulation becomes more
stringent, then DT rises and a marginally profitable
product under the old regulatory regime would be-
come unprofitable under the new regime, Thus, the
firm would not develop it. However, if initial de-
velopment is complete, a firm ignores past (sunk)
development costs, balances expected testing costs
(T) against potential revenues, and may continue
development.
Of the three regulatory variables, ARUL72 is our
preferred proxy for EPA regulation because it is a
strictly exogenous variable that is based on the
actual EPA-estimated costs of human safety and
environmental testing requirements. As indicated
above, the other two proxies are used to verify the
robustness of our results. Although industry human
safety and environmental testing costs as a percent-
age of research expenditures (AVREGJ change
with changes in regulatory stringency, A VREG
may overstate regulatory impact. Firms would
likely do some toxicological and environmental
testing in the absence of regulation because, as
shown by Beach and Carlson (1993), farmers value
the user safety and environmental attributes of pes-
ticides. Additionally, the proxy using the number
of employees at the Office of Pesticide Programs
(PESLAB) may suffer from measurement errorsOllinger and Fernandez-Cornejo r .. . ~,, ,.- ,, . . . -.
because it includes employees dedicated to regis-
tration activities and employees performing other
pesticide-related activities,
Chemical Pesticide Toxicity Model
Chemical pesticides are biologically active, and
many may be toxic either to fish and wildlife or to
human health. Concern over toxicity led the EPA
to require producers to place acute toxicity ratings
(I, II, III, or IV) for the chemical pesticide on the
label of the container. A rating of I is the most
toxic, Acute toxicity ratings are based on the LD50
value, which is the dose of a toxicant necessruy to
kill 5070of the test animals studied within the first
thirty days after exposure. The EPA also requires
labels to include information about chronic human
effects and harm from inhalation, about skin ab-
sorption, and about eye damage. Additionally, reg-
istrations must state whether the chemical pesticide
harms fish or wildlife.
The various reporting requirements stem from
differences in the health and environmental effects
of chemical pesticides. Those chemical pesticides
that have a high acute toxicity rating, cause chronic
health effects, or are harmful to fish and wildlife
may be considered “more toxic,” Those that have
a low acute toxicity rating, have no chronic health
effects, and do not harm fish or wildlife may be
classified as “less toxic.”5 This ability to identify
degrees of toxicity allows one to create a binary
toxicity variable for each chemical pesticide.
We define “less toxic” in two ways, Under one
definition, a chemical pesticide is defined as
“less” toxic if it has a Class II, III, or IV acute
toxicity rating, has no chronic health toxicity, and
is not toxic to fish or wildlife. Under the other
definition, a chemical pesticide is considered “less
toxic” if it has no chronic health effects and is not
toxic to fish or wildlife. The first definition in-
cludes all types of chemical pesticide toxicity con-
sidered by the EPA. The second definition includes
only those aspects of regulation that changed with
the 1972 FIFRA amendment,
In equation (2) we regress the ratio of less toxic
chemical pesticides to all chemical pesticides
(LESSTOX) on pesticide industry research expen-
ditures (RDIND), the Herfindahl Index (HERF),
s During the late 1960s and early 1970s, scientists determined that
many pesticides previously thought to be harmless, such as chlorinated
hydrocarbons, were actually carcinogenic or had an adverse impact on
the environment. As a result, some previously approved pesticides were
banned by the EPA after promulgation of FIFRA. Since we base toxicity
ratings on current scientific knowledge, our toxicity definition is consis-
tent with all current understanding of pesticide toxicity,
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the proportion of international entrants (INT2),
regulation (ARUL72), and control variables for
farm sector market conditions (PRICES) and
chemical pesticide sales growth (GRO W2). Again,
we use three proxies of regulation to examine
model robustness (see Appendix A for complete
definitions):
(2) LESSTOX, = ~8 + @pRDIND, + ~l@ERFt
+ & JN72, + ~12ARUL72,
+ ~l~PRICESt + ~14GROW2t
+ q.
We argue above that research expenditures
should negatively affect the number of “less
toxic” chemical pesticides and that regulation
should positively affect the number of less toxic
pesticides. This is not to say that firms do not
respond to the demand for human health and en-
vironmental qualities, Since we have controlled for
research expenditures devoted to the demand for
human and environmental qualities (ARUL72), the
sign of the coefficient on research should reflect
the impact of research expenditures for effective-
ness qualities. Since pests are governed by biologi-
cal processes, greater effectiveness results from
greater toxicity.
The Herfindahl Index should positively affect
the number of less toxic chemical pesticides be-
cause prior research suggests that surviving pesti-
cide companies tended to be larger and better able
to avoid regulatory penalties than other companies
(Ollinger and Fernandez-Cornejo 1995). The pro-
portion of international entrants, agricultural
prices, and industry growth are control variables
for the influence of international entrants, farm




Data include all new chemical pesticide registra-
tions introduced by the major (top twenty) chemi-
cal pesticide firms over the 1972-91 period iden-
tified in Kline and Company reports (1974-91).
Biological pesticides, which comprise about 2% of
the pesticide market, are not considered because
they are naturally occurring organisms with less
rigorous regulatory requirements and much lower
regulatory costs than chemical pesticides.
New chemical pesticide registrations came from
Aspelin and Bishop (1991). Pesticide toxicity data
came from the Farm Chemicals Handbook ’93
(Meister 1993), CPCR (1992), and EXTOXNET22 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
(1994). Firm research expenditures came from the
Bureau of the Census (1972–89a), Kline and Com-
pany (1989, 1991) reports, annual reports, and SEC
(1972–89) filings.6 The Bureau of the Census
(1972-89b) and Kline and Company firm sales
data (1974-9 1) were used to determine firm mar-
ket share, Industry pesticide research, industry av-
erage product development period, and industry
sales data came from NACA (197 1–92). Industry
value added came from census files. The Herfind-
ahl Index is based on the computed market shares.
Agricultural prices and planted acreage came from
the USDA (1974–91). Price-sensitive data were
deflated by the GNP price deflator.
Rule descriptions and the costs of performing
new environmental and toxicity tests for the 1978,
1982, and 1994 EPA rules came from the EPA
(1978, 1982, 1994).
Industry regulatory costs came from NACA
(1971–92). These costs were assumed to include
all environmental testing, toxicology studies, and
EPA registration costs. Search, synthesis, field
testing, and process development costs were as-
sumed to be nonregulatory costs. Labor employ-
ment at Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP) of the
EPA came from EPA budgets. Further information
about these data is available from the authors upon
request.
Estimation
Sutton (1991) shows that exogenous sunk costs,
such as pesticide product regulation, positively af-
fect endogenous sunk costs (research expendi-
tures), making a two-stage regression necessary. In
the first stage, we purge research (RESEARCH) of
its dependence on regulation and other factors by
creating the instrumental variable FIRMRD--the
predicted value of firm pesticide research expen-
ditures. We use all exogenous variables and total
firm research expenditures as instruments.
New chemical pesticide registrations approxi-
mately follow a Poisson distribution, with most
firms in most years introducing no new chemical
pesticides. One approach may be to use a Poisson
6 The Bureau of the Census’s Survey of Industrial Research (1972–
89a) contains resenrch expenditures only for chemical pesticides, while
Kline and Comprmy (1989, 1991) data contains pesticide resenrch data.
Neither data set includes other types of research expenditures. Various
issues (1972–89) of annual reports from the following companies were
examined: BASF, Bayer, Chevron, Dow, Eli LI1ly, FMC, Monsanto,
Rhone Poulenc, Rohm and Hairs, Shell, Stauffer, Union Carbide, arrd
Velsicol. Vtwious issues (1972-89) of SEC filings for the following
companies were examined BASF, Chevron, Rhone Poulenc, Rohm and
Hnas, Shell, and Stauffer.
regression, but this specification requires that the
mean be equal to the variance. Interfirm differ-
ences in research productivity cause the variance to
grow faster than the mean and result in over (un-
der) dispersion (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Tron-
gon 1984).
McCullagh andNelder(1983) demonstrated that
the use of quasi-likelihood techniques (QL) over-
comes problems of over (under) dispersion by pro-
viding added flexibility to a Poisson regression.
Rather than strictly defining a statistical relation-
ship, this method allows the mean (u) to be only
proportional to the variance. Moreover, the un-
known distribution is specified to be of the linear
exponential family, a general class of distributions
(Thomas 1990).
Quasi-likelihood estimates can be obtained with
the use of nonlinear weighted least squares. The
variance of the mean V(u) is used as a weight. The
dispersion parameter (UG~~) is estimated from the
weighted sum of the square divided by the differ-
ence between the number of observations (k) and
model degrees of freedom p (equation [3]). A value
of one indicates an absence of over (under) disper-
sion. The dispersion parameter (table 2) indicates
that some underdispersion exists.
(y-u)’
x— ~ v(u)
(3) &= ~k_p) .
Inference about individual parameters is based
on the asymptotic standard errors and t-statistics
reported by the statistical package. Inference for
multiple parameters is based on the QL function
for a Poisson distribution, 1(u; y) (Carrel and Ru-
pert 1988), in equation (4).
(4) 1(U;y) = y log (u) – u
Equation (5) shows that the difference between
the restricted and unrestricted model estimates is
approximately equal to the dispersion parameter
times the chi-square statistic, X2.The restricted pa-
rameter estimate is b,..t and the unrestricted esti-
mate is b~a. The X2statistic is reported in table 2.
(5)
(
2AQLF = 2 ~l(U(b~U; y))
k
Equation (2) is estimated with a two-stage SUR
method and industry-level data covering the 1972–
89 period. Since an increase in exogenous sunkOllinger and Fernandez-Comejo Innovation and Regulation in the Pesticide lndust~ 23
Table 2. Estimates of the Determinants of
Chemical Pesticide Innovations
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
































Observations 388 388 388
Sigma 0.96 0.94 0.94
X2 55.5 68.0 58.5
NOTE: Dependent variable: number of chemical pesticide reg-
istrations. Cases 1, 2, and 3 refer to models using ARUL72,
A VREG, and PESI.AB as regulatory terms, respectively.
Sigma = dispersion parameter.
*** 1% significance; **5%significance; *10?ZOsignificance.
(regulatory) costs may affect the level of endog-
enous sunk (research) costs (Sutton 1991), we cre-
ate an instrumental variable (INDRD) for industry
pesticide research (RDIND). Instruments include
value added and all the exogenous variables of
equation (2). Value added was obtained from cen-
sus bureau files.
Either autocorrelation or the theoretical limits
imposed by the upper and lower bounds could con-
found the estimates of equation (2). However, an
OLS regression indicates that autocorrelation is not
present. Additionally, since the regression was es-
timated within its theoretical bounds, estimates of
equation (2) with a “two limit” tobit (Maddala
1983) are similar. Hence, since neither autocorre-
lation nor the theoretical bounds bias the results,
the model was estimated with a SUR econometric
approach. The instrumental variable for industry
research and the other variables of equation (2) are
used as the explanatory variables. There were no
adjustments for autocorrelation. The Durbin-
Watson statistics are reported in table 3.
Results
Chemical Pesticide Innovation
Results of the three alternative regulatory cases
over the 1972–91 period are reported in table 2,
They suggest that pesticide research expenditures,
firm market share growth, and international en-
trants relate positively to new chemical pesticide
registrations. Regulation and the interaction term
between international entrants and pesticide re-
search negatively affect new chemical pesticide
registrations. Market share is negative but insig-
nificant, and industry growth is positive but insig-
nificant. Since we use an instrumental variable for
research, the regulatory term is an expression that
is net of its impact on research expenditures and
reflects increases in research expenditures for hu-
man health and environmental testing costs on in-
novation.
Of considerable interest are the negative and sig-
nificant signs on all of the alternative regulation
term coefficients. Since the variables are in log
form, the coefficient on EPA-anticipated costs
(ARUL72) suggests that a 10% increase in the
EPA-anticipated cost leads to a 20.2% decline in
innovation. The coefficient of the ratio of regula-
tory costs to industry pesticide research (AVREG)
shows that a 10% increase in expenditures used for
toxicological and environmental testing as a frac-
tion of all pesticide research and development ex-
penditures results in a 1570 reduction in innova-
tion. The coefficient for pesticide division labor
(PESLAB) suggests that an increase in regulatory
effort of 1070leads to about a 1670decline in in-
novation. These results are consistent with CAST
(1981). They are also consistent with Hatch (1982)
who estimated that the increase in the time re-
quired to bring a new pesticide to market over the
1968–82 period resulted in a 7Y0–9Y0 decrease in
pesticide registrations.
We also considered changes in regulatory strin-
gency. We split the 1972–91 period into two sub-
periods—1972–8 1 and 1982–91. First period re-
sults are similar to those reported for the overall
period. Second period results for regulation are not
significant. Since the first period regulatory effects
are similar to those for the whole period and the
second period has no consistently significant
change, there appears to be little change in strin-
gency over the 1972–91 period. We do not report
results, but they are available from the authors.
The positive and significant influence of pesti-
cide research expenditures is consistent with re-
search on pharmaceutical innovation (Thomas24 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economic.r Review
Table 3. Estimates of the Determinants of Less Toxic Chemical Pesticides
Toxicity Types
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
Fish/Wildlife Fish/Wildlife Fish/Wildlife Fkh/Wildlife Fish/Wildlife FM/WildIife






































































Observations 18 18 18 18 18 18
DW 1.99 1.81 1.67 1.95 1.61 1.72
R2 0.59 0.53 0.45 0.31 0.43 0.47
NOTE:Dependent variable: proportion of less toxic chemical pesticides to all chemical pesticides. Cases 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 refer
to alternative specifications of the toxicity regressions.
*** 1~. significance; **5% significance; *10% significance.
1990). The positive influence of market share
growth is consistent with Demsetz (1973) and
Klepper and Graddy (1990) in that past success
fosters future success. The insignificance of the
market share term suggests that market power had
no effect on innovation. This result is consistent
with Kline and Company sales data (1974-91 ),
which shows that many firms with high market
share produced mainly nonproprietary agricultural
chemicals.
The positive sign of the international entrant
variable indicates that foreign-based entrants had a
lower cost of innovation than did firms with a
larger U.S. pesticide research presence. This does
not, however, imply that international entrants had
higher pesticide research productivity, As sug-
gested by Teece (1982), international entrants
could use pesticides developed for overseas mar-
kets in the United States without undertaking U.S.
research. The negative sign on the international
entrant and research interaction term supports this
view, suggesting that international entrants with
more than $20 million in U.S. pesticide research
expenditures did not have higher research produc-
tivity than other companies,
Results of the impact of pesticide regulation on
chemical pesticide innovation are similar to yet
different from previous studies. Like Grabowski,
Vernon, and Thomas (1978) and Thomas (1990)
and consistent with Hatch (1982) and CAST
(1981), we find that EPA regulation has a negative
influence on innovation. Unlike Thomas, we do
not find an increase in regulatory stringency over
time.
Chemical Pesticide Toxicity
Table 3 contains the results of six regression mod-
els of the proportion of less toxic chemical pesti-
cides on several independent variables, Cases 1, 3,
and 5 are for the three alternative regulatory vari-
ables and the definition of a “less toxic” pesticide
as being a pesticide with a low acute toxicity rat-
ing, no chronic health toxicity, and no toxicity to
either fish or wildlife, Cases 2, 4, and 6 are for the
three alternative regulatory variables and the defi-
nition of a “less toxic” pesticide as being a pes-
ticide with no chronic health toxicity and no tox-
icity to either fish or wildlife.
Results suggest that regulation encouraged the
development of less toxic chemical pesticides. A
10% increase in EPA-anticipated costs would re-
sult in a 10?loincrease in new chemical pesticides
being classified as “less” rather than “more”Ollinger and Fernandez-Comejo Innovation and Regulation in the Pesticide Industry 25
toxic. A 10% increase in health and environmental
testing costs (about $1.5 million per pesticide)
would result in a 5% increase in the number of
pesticides classified as <‘less” rather than <‘more”
toxic. Since results for Cases 1, 3, and 5 are almost
identical to those for 2, 4, and 6, it appears that
EPA regulation mainly affected chronic health tox-
icity and fish and wildlife toxicity.
The negative sign on the coefficient for pesticide
research spending in equation (2) suggests that an
increase in pesticide research expenditures leads to
the development of a smaller proportion of less
toxic chemical pesticides.7 This result is consistent
with the hypothesis that farmers value pesticide
efficacy more than health and environmental ef-
fects, and that chemical pesticides with high effi-
cacy are also very toxic and costly to develop.
The chemical pesticide toxicity regression also
shows that the Herfindahl Index and industry
growth had positive influences on the proportion of
less toxic chemical pesticides. Farm prices nega-
tively influenced the proportion of less toxic
chemical pesticides. The positive effect of the Her-
findahl Index is consistent with previous research
indicating that larger firms incur lower regulatory-
related costs than do smaller ones (Ollinger and
Fernandez-Cornejo 1995).
The proportion of international entrants had no
effect on chemical pesticide toxicity and was
dropped. Since the above results include only
chemical pesticides developed by the major pesti-
cide companies, we also evaluated changes in the
proportion of less toxic chemical pesticides for the
entire pesticide industry. The results for this larger
sample are similar.
Concluding Comments
A major finding of this paper is that the regulatory
costs (i.e., research expenditures required for hu-
man health and environmental testing costs) nega-
tively affect the number of new chemical pesticide
registrations and drive up the cost of bringing a
new pesticide to market. These results support
Greene, Hartley, and West (1977) in that regula-
tion negatively affects innovation and encourages
firms to focus more of their research effort on the
7 The regulation variable captures farmer and societal demand for user
health and environmental qualities, while the research expenditures vari-
able reflects the demand for greater pesticide effectiveness. As argued
above, since pests are governed by biological processes, greater effec-
tiveness should result from greater toxicity.
develo ment of chemical pesticides for major field
crops.t
Another major result is that regulation encour-
ages firms to develop less toxic chemical pesti-
cides. Although this finding is in conflict with
some experts, such as Greene, Hartley, and West
(1977), who suggest that regulation likely causes
firms to develop more toxic chemical pesticides, it
agrees with historical evidence. After the EPA
banned DDT and several other chemical pesticides
that persist in the environment, pesticide firms fo-
cused their research on pesticides that degrade rap-
idly and stopped the development of harmful
chemical pesticides that persist in the environment.
Results of this paper are consistent with research
on the effect of pesticide regulation on innovation
(Hatch 1982; CAST 1981) and the effect of phar-
maceutical regulation on innovation (Peltzman
1973; Grabowski, Vernon, and Thomas 1978;
Thomas 1990). Results extend previous research
by suggesting that regulation forces a tradeoff in
which fewer novel pesticides are introduced, but
those pesticides tend to have fewer toxic side ef-
fects than those introduced previously,
Results of this paper are reassuring from a pub-
lic policy perspective. Most economic studies ac-
knowledge that pesticide regulation adversely af-
fects innovation. Much more controversial is the
impact of regulation on pesticide toxicity. The em-
pirical research presented here supports those
economists and policymakers who argue that regu-
lation encourages the development of less toxic
pesticides and who suggest that a tradeoff exists
between less toxic pesticides and less innovation.
The decline in chemical pesticide innovation
suggests that market opportunities exist for more
environmentally appealing nonchemical pesticide
alternatives. Microbial and biochemical pesticides
are environmentally appealing because they occur
naturally. Genetically modified plants with pest-
resistant characteristics are also environmentally
appealing because they reduce the need for chemi-
cal pesticides. However, even though sales of
nonchemical pesticide alternatives are increasing
8Since an increase in regulatory stringent y increases development
costs and thus reduces the gap between potential revenues and costs, the
development of some minor crop pesticides becomes unprofitable as
regulato~ stringency increases. Hence, an increase in regulatory costs
should cause new chemical pesticide registrations for vegetables and
other low-revenue (minor) crops to decline and should encourage firms
to focus their research effort on chemical pesticides for major crop uses.
We examined tfris hypothesis by regressing crop uses (i.e., proportion
of pesticides used on major crops) on regulation, research expendihrres,
tbe Herfhrdrdrl Index, and indust~ grnwtb. Preliminmy results indicate
that regulation encourages firms to develop proportionately more pesti-
cides for major crops.26 April 1998 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
rapidly because of recent technological advance- chemical pesticides in the medium term because
ments permitting protection against numerous most nonchemical pesticide alternatives protect
pests—a formerly limiting factor (Krimskey and crops against harmful insects and fungi and offer
Wrubel 1993)—they are unlikely to replace little protection against harmful weeds.
Appendix A


















New chemical pesticide registrations at the EPA.
(Al) FIRMRD,,, = (J~oRD,.j)ln
where RD is firm pesticide research expenditures and n is the time from discovery to pesticide registration.
Thomas (1990) used a similar definition for pharmaceutical innovations because that industry also had a
variable lag structure for product development. Also, Sharp and NACA (1971–92) data suggest that
pesticide research costs are evenly distributed over the product development cycle.
A dummy variable equal to one for international entrants, i.e., firms that have large overseas sales but no
U.S. research expenditures and low U.S. sales in 1972, and zero otherwise.
Interaction term between lNT and FIRMRD.
Lag of market share, which is based on company and industry sales.
Lag of the three-year average of LSHAR.WLSHARE,.,. Used as a measure of firm growth because our
specification is in log form, which does not allow the use of negative numbers.
Defined in the same composite form as FIRMRD in equation (A. 1) above, except that the ratio (PROPSE, +
RULEr)/RULE71 replaces RD. PROPOSE, is the EPA-anticipated cost of proposed rules in year t. RULE,
is the cost of all rules in existence in year r. RULE71 is tbe cost of rules in existence in 1971. A
composite form is used because research requires many years and regulatory effects occur throughout the
chemical pesticide product development cycle. ARUL72 assumes that firms began adhering to the 1978
rule changes in 1972, to 1982 rule changes in 1978, and to 1994 rule changes in 1983. For further
justification see “Regulatory Variables” section of the text.
Defined in the same way as FIRMRD in equation (A. 1) above, except that the ratio of pesticide research for
environmental tests to total research expenditures replaces RDr For further explanation see “Regulatory
Vwiables” section and the definition of ARUL72. See also description of regulatory costs in “Data”
section.
Defined in the same way as FIRMRD in equation (A. 1) above, except that BUDGETED STAFF-YEARS at
the OPP replace RD. Warren and Chilton (1989) maintain that staffing levels reflect regulatory intensity.
See “Regulatory Variables” section and the definition of ARUL72 for further discussion.
Deflated agricultural prices.
The five-year average of S, /S,. ~, in which S, is current year sales and S,.l is previous year sales. This
definition of growth is employed because our specification is in log form, which does not allow the use of
negative numbers.
Ratio of the four-year moving average of the number of less toxic new chemical pesticides to the four-year
average of all new registered chemical pesticides. We used a moving average because some years have
very few registrations and other years have numerous registrations, making smoothing the data necessary.
Industry research expenditures, in hundreds of millions of dollars, defined in a way similar to firm research
(FIRMRD), with industry research expenditures replacing RD.
The Herfkrdahl Index, defined as the sum of the squares of company market shares.
The proportion of international entrants.
The two-vear moving average of the ratio of current year Planted acreage to Previous year planted acreage.
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